Threat Hunting

Automated detection has a structural limit: it only catches what you’ve told it to look for. An attacker who has stolen valid credentials and moves “like an administrator” triggers no anomaly, because they’re doing nothing technically wrong. Threat hunting starts from the uncomfortable premise — an intruder may already be inside, and alerts have gaps — and actively searches for them, with hypotheses tested against data. It’s the difference between waiting for the alarm and walking through the house with a torch yourself.

How we work

• Hypothesis-driven — we formulate a concrete assumption (“if an adversary did X, I’d see Y in telemetry”) and test it; we don’t rummage through data randomly
• Hunting loop — hypothesis → investigation in telemetry → new patterns discovered → enrichment of automated detections, then again
• On MITRE ATT&CK techniques — we structure the hunt on the tactics and techniques of probable adversaries, prioritised by how “expensive” they are for the attacker: we look for behaviours (lateral movement, LOLBin abuse, persistence), not just easily changed indicators

We use the telemetry you already have — EDR/XDR, SIEM logs, network flow, DNS, authentication, cloud, process data (Sysmon) — and combine indicator-based searching with behavioural hunting, the only kind that catches what is truly new.

What you get

• Hunt report: hypotheses tested, data sources, methodology and findings — including “nothing found”, a valid result that provides assurance
• Any confirmed incident, immediately handed off to the response team
• New detections (Sigma / EDR / SIEM rules) created from findings — the most durable outcome of a good hunt
• Visibility gaps identified and an ATT&CK coverage map