Security architecture

The most expensive security problems are not bugs but architecture decisions — a flat network where any machine can reach anything, a service that implicitly trusts everything coming from inside, an identity that opens too many doors. Once built, they are expensive and painful to change. Security architecture moves the effort forward, where it is cheap: it makes the secure option the default.

How we work

• Secure-by-design — requirements and controls go in from the start, not bolted on at the end: defence in depth, least privilege, “fail securely”, minimal attack surface
• Threat modelling (STRIDE) — for each element in the data-flow diagram we systematically ask what can go wrong (spoofing, tampering, repudiation, disclosure, DoS, escalation) and what we do about each
• Segmentation and isolation — zones, micro-segmentation, DMZ, so that a foothold doesn’t become full access (blast-radius limitation)
• Zero Trust (NIST SP 800-207) — “never trust, always verify”: strong identity, per-request authorisation, least privilege, an “assume breach” posture instead of implicit network trust
• Review gates — checkpoints where the design is verified against requirements and the threat model before build begins

What you get

• Target security architecture and a library of reusable patterns
• Threat model: data-flow diagrams with STRIDE analysis and prioritised measures
• Segmentation and Zero Trust design, with a transition roadmap
• Architecture review findings, with a register of accepted exceptions
• Control mapping to the applicable framework (NIST 800-207, CIS, ISO 27001)